CONFIDENTIAL — DEMO-WS01 — MITRE ATT&CK Endpoint Assessment — DEM-MITRE-2026-002
MITRE ATT&CK Assessment

Endpoint Security Assessment

This MITRE ATT&CK assessment of DEMO-WS01 identified 15 findings across credential management, defense configuration, and network exposure. The most critical gaps are a primary user account with no password requirement, disabled Defender tamper protection, and RDP exposed on all network interfaces. Credential access controls scored lowest at D (48%), primarily due to the password-less account and incomplete Credential Guard deployment, while persistence controls scored highest at B (78%) with all autostart entries mapping to legitimate applications.

Hostname
DEMO-WS01
Document ID
DEM-MITRE-2026-002
Date
6 March 2026
OS
Microsoft Windows 11 Pro
Mode
Full Scan
Techniques
10 checked
01 — Executive Summary

Security Posture Overview

MITRE ATT&CK endpoint assessment for DEMO-WS01

15
Total Findings
0
Critical
3
High
10
Techniques
Critical
0
High
3
3
Medium
6
6
Low
4
4
Info
2
2
⚡ Quick Wins

Enable Tamper Protection in Windows Security settings (2 minutes)
Set a strong password on the primary user account (1 minute)
Enable PowerShell Script Block Logging via registry (5 minutes)
Quote or remove the unused ASUS service path (2 minutes)
Restrict RDP to trusted IPs via Windows Firewall (10 minutes)

02 — Scope & Methodology

Assessment Scope

This assessment maps local system state to the MITRE ATT&CK Framework. 10 techniques were evaluated using deterministic PowerShell checks with zero-token data collection.

TechniqueNameTactic
T1547Boot/Logon AutostartPersistence
T1078Valid AccountsCredential Access
T1046Network Service DiscoveryDiscovery
T1562Impair DefensesDefense Evasion
T1053Scheduled Task/JobExecution
T1059Command and ScriptingExecution
T1036MasqueradingDefense Evasion
T1003OS Credential DumpingCredential Access
T1071Application Layer ProtocolCommand and Control
T1027Obfuscated FilesDefense Evasion
03 — ATT&CK Coverage

Tactic Coverage Radar

Security posture across MITRE ATT&CK tactic dimensions

MITRE ATT&CK Tactic Scores
Persistence (B)Def. Evasion (C)Execution (C)Cred. Access (D)Discovery (C)
T1547
1
Boot/Logon Autostart
T1078
3
Valid Accounts
T1046
2
Network Service Discovery
T1562
3
Impair Defenses
T1053
0
Scheduled Task/Job
T1059
3
Command and Scripting
T1036
2
Masquerading
T1003
1
OS Credential Dumping
T1071
0
Application Layer Protocol
T1027
0
Obfuscated Files
04 — Detailed Findings

Security Findings

15 findings across 10 MITRE ATT&CK techniques

DEM-001 High T1562.001

Windows Defender Tamper Protection Disabled

Tamper Protection prevents unauthorized modifications to Windows Defender settings, including real-time protection, cloud-delivered protection, and behavior monitoring. With tamper protection disabled, malware or a threat actor with local access could silently disable Defender without triggering alerts.

Likelihood
Impact
Evidence & Remediation
Evidence
Get-MpComputerStatus | Select TamperProtection
TamperProtectionSource: N/A
IsTamperProtected: False

Real-time protection: Enabled
Behavior monitor: Enabled
Signature age: 0 days (current)
Remediation
Enable Tamper Protection via Windows Security > Virus & threat protection > Virus & threat protection settings > Tamper Protection = On.

For managed environments, deploy via Intune: Endpoint security > Antivirus > Windows Security experience > Tamper Protection = Enable.

Note: Tamper Protection requires cloud-delivered protection to be enabled.
DEM-002 High T1078.003

Primary User Account Has No Password Requirement

The primary user account (admin-level) has no password requirement set. This means the account can be accessed without any credential, creating a critical authentication gap. Combined with RDP exposure, this could allow unauthenticated remote access to an administrator session.

Likelihood
Impact
Evidence & Remediation
Evidence
Get-LocalUser | Where-Object { $_.Enabled -eq $true }
Name: User01 | PasswordRequired: False | PasswordExpires: Never | Enabled: True

Admin group membership confirmed: DEMO-WS01\User01 is a local administrator
Remediation
Set a strong password on the account immediately:
  net user User01 * (interactive prompt)

Then enforce password policy:
  net accounts /minpwlen:12 /maxpwage:90

For enterprise management, deploy via Intune or Group Policy:
  Computer Configuration > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Account Policies > Password Policy
DEM-003 High T1046

RDP Exposed on All Network Interfaces

Remote Desktop Protocol (port 3389) is listening on all interfaces (0.0.0.0 and ::), making it accessible from any network the host is connected to. Without Network Level Authentication (NLA) enforcement and combined with weak account passwords, this presents a significant attack surface for brute-force and credential-stuffing attacks.

Likelihood
Impact
Evidence & Remediation
Evidence
Get-NetTCPConnection -State Listen | Where LocalPort -eq 3389
LocalAddress: 0.0.0.0  LocalPort: 3389  Process: svchost (PID 2000)
LocalAddress: ::       LocalPort: 3389  Process: svchost (PID 2000)

Firewall profiles: Domain=Enabled, Private=Enabled, Public=Enabled
Remediation
Restrict RDP access via Windows Firewall:
  1. Create inbound rule allowing RDP only from trusted IPs/subnets
  2. Enable NLA: System Properties > Remote > "Allow connections only from computers running Remote Desktop with Network Level Authentication"
  3. Consider disabling RDP entirely if not needed, or restrict to VPN/Tailscale only

For managed environments: Deploy RDP restrictions via Intune Endpoint Security > Attack surface reduction rules.
DEM-004 Medium T1562

Windows Update Service Stopped

The Windows Update service (wuauserv) is currently stopped with a manual start type. While Windows 11 manages this service dynamically, a persistently stopped update service can delay critical security patches, leaving the system vulnerable to known exploits.

Likelihood
Impact
Evidence & Remediation
Evidence
Get-Service wuauserv | Select Status, StartType
Status: Stopped
StartType: Manual

Note: Windows 11 starts this service on-demand for update checks. Verify updates are being applied via Settings > Windows Update.
Remediation
Verify update status: Settings > Windows Update > Check for updates.

If updates are stale, restart the service:
  Start-Service wuauserv
  (New-Object -ComObject Microsoft.Update.AutoUpdate).DetectNow()

For managed environments: Verify Windows Update for Business or WSUS policies are applying correctly via Intune compliance policies.
DEM-005 Medium T1059.001

PowerShell Script Block Logging Disabled

PowerShell Script Block Logging records the content of all script blocks that are processed, providing critical forensic evidence for incident response. Without this logging, malicious PowerShell execution (including deobfuscated commands) would not be captured in event logs, severely limiting detection and response capabilities.

Likelihood
Impact
Evidence & Remediation
Evidence
Registry: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging
EnableScriptBlockLogging: Not configured (disabled)

Module Logging: Also disabled
Transcription: Disabled
Language Mode: FullLanguage
Remediation
Enable via Group Policy:
  Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Windows PowerShell > Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging = Enabled

Or via registry:
  New-Item -Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging' -Force
  Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging' -Name 'EnableScriptBlockLogging' -Value 1

For managed environments: Deploy via Intune Settings Catalog > PowerShell Script Block Logging.
DEM-006 Medium T1003.001

Credential Guard Not Fully Configured

Virtualization-Based Security (VBS) is enabled (DeviceGuard = 2) but Credential Guard services are not running (SecurityServicesRunning = [0]). This means LSASS credentials are not protected by hardware isolation, leaving them vulnerable to memory-scraping tools like Mimikatz. LSA Protection (RunAsPPL) is enabled, providing software-level protection, but hardware-backed Credential Guard offers stronger guarantees.

Likelihood
Impact
Evidence & Remediation
Evidence
VirtualizationBasedSecurityStatus: 2 (Enabled)
SecurityServicesRunning: [0] (None)
SecurityServicesConfigured: [0] (None)

LSA Protection (RunAsPPL): Enabled
WDigest UseLogonCredential: 0 (plaintext passwords disabled)
Remediation
Enable Credential Guard:
  1. Verify hardware supports VBS: msinfo32 > Virtualization-based security
  2. Enable via Group Policy: Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > System > Device Guard > Turn on Virtualization Based Security > Credential Guard = Enabled with UEFI lock
  3. Reboot required

For managed environments: Deploy via Intune Endpoint Security > Account Protection > Credential Guard.
DEM-007 Medium T1562.001

Broad Windows Defender Path Exclusions

Windows Defender has 10 path exclusions and 12 process exclusions configured. While some exclusions are necessary for development tools (Node.js, Git), broad exclusions on directories like Temp and user profile folders create blind spots where malware could execute undetected. Attackers frequently target excluded directories to evade endpoint protection.

Likelihood
Impact
Evidence & Remediation
Evidence
Path Exclusions (10):
  - Development directories (source code repos)
  - Package manager caches (npm, fnm)
  - User temp directories
  - Local AppData temp

Process Exclusions (12):
  - node.exe, npm.cmd, npx.cmd
  - git.exe, git-remote-https.exe
  - ssh.exe
  - File sync utilities
  - Various wildcard patterns
Remediation
Review and minimize exclusions:
  1. Remove broad temp directory exclusions — use specific process exclusions instead
  2. Replace directory-level exclusions with file-type exclusions where possible
  3. Audit: Get-MpPreference | Select-Object -ExpandProperty ExclusionPath

Consider using ASR (Attack Surface Reduction) rules to compensate:
  Set-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids <rule-id> -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions Enabled

For managed environments: Audit exclusions via Intune > Endpoint Security > Antivirus > Exclusions report.
DEM-008 Medium T1036.005

Unquoted Service Path Vulnerability

The ASUS System Control Service has an unquoted service path containing spaces. While the service is currently disabled and stopped, unquoted paths allow privilege escalation if an attacker can place an executable at a path parsed before the intended binary (e.g., 'C:\Program Files (x86)\ASUS\AsSysCtrlService\1.00.22\AsSysCtrlService.exe' could be hijacked with 'C:\Program.exe').

Likelihood
Impact
Evidence & Remediation
Evidence
Service: AsSysCtrlService
Display: ASUS System Control Service
Path: C:\Program Files (x86)\ASUS\AsSysCtrlService\1.00.22\AsSysCtrlService.exe
State: Stopped
StartMode: Disabled

Path contains spaces but is not quoted.
Remediation
Quote the service path:
  sc.exe config AsSysCtrlService binPath= '"C:\Program Files (x86)\ASUS\AsSysCtrlService\1.00.22\AsSysCtrlService.exe"'

Or if the service is no longer needed (ASUS utility), remove it:
  sc.exe delete AsSysCtrlService

Audit for other unquoted paths:
  Get-CimInstance Win32_Service | Where-Object { $_.PathName -match '\s' -and $_.PathName -notmatch '"' }
DEM-009 Medium T1078.003

Primary User Password Never Expires

The primary user account has password expiry set to 'Never'. While modern guidance (NIST 800-63B) de-emphasises mandatory rotation, combining a never-expiring password with the finding that no password is required (DEM-002) means that if a password is eventually set, it would never be rotated, increasing the window for credential compromise.

Likelihood
Impact
Evidence & Remediation
Evidence
Get-LocalUser User01 | Select PasswordExpires
PasswordExpires: Never

System password policy:
  Maximum password age: 42 days
  Minimum password length: 0
  Lockout threshold: 10 attempts
  Lockout duration: 10 minutes

Note: System policy enforces 42-day max age but the per-user setting overrides this.
Remediation
Set password expiry on the account:
  Set-LocalUser -Name User01 -PasswordNeverExpires $false

This will inherit the system password policy (42-day maximum age).

For managed environments: Enforce via Intune compliance policy requiring password expiry aligned with organisational policy.
DEM-010 Low T1046

PostgreSQL Database Exposed on All Interfaces

PostgreSQL (port 5432) is listening on all network interfaces (0.0.0.0 and ::). Database services should typically bind to localhost or specific trusted interfaces only, as exposure to the network increases the attack surface for brute-force attacks against database credentials.

Likelihood
Impact
Evidence & Remediation
Evidence
Get-NetTCPConnection -State Listen | Where LocalPort -eq 5432
LocalAddress: 0.0.0.0  LocalPort: 5432  Process: postgres (PID 8616)
LocalAddress: ::       LocalPort: 5432  Process: postgres (PID 8616)

Context: Development workstation PostgreSQL instance.
Remediation
Restrict PostgreSQL to localhost only:
  Edit postgresql.conf: listen_addresses = 'localhost'
  Restart PostgreSQL service

If remote access is needed, use pg_hba.conf to restrict to specific IP addresses and require SSL connections.

Alternatively, add Windows Firewall rules to block port 5432 from external networks.
DEM-011 Low T1059.001

PowerShell Module Logging Disabled

PowerShell Module Logging records pipeline execution details for specified modules, providing visibility into cmdlet usage patterns. While less critical than Script Block Logging, module logging helps detect reconnaissance and lateral movement commands (e.g., Get-ADUser, Invoke-Command).

Likelihood
Impact
Evidence & Remediation
Evidence
Registry: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging
EnableModuleLogging: Not configured (disabled)

Transcription logging: Also disabled
Remediation
Enable via Group Policy:
  Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Windows PowerShell > Turn on Module Logging = Enabled
  Module Names: * (all modules)

Or via registry:
  New-Item -Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging' -Force
  Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging' -Name 'EnableModuleLogging' -Value 1
DEM-012 Low T1036

Service Running from User Profile Directory

The Cloudflared service is running from the user profile directory rather than a standard program installation path. While Cloudflared is a legitimate Cloudflare tunnel agent, services running from user-writable directories are more susceptible to binary replacement attacks, as the user profile has less restrictive ACLs than Program Files.

Likelihood
Impact
Evidence & Remediation
Evidence
Service: Cloudflared
Path: C:\Users\User01\cloudflared.exe
State: Running

Expected location: C:\Program Files\Cloudflare\cloudflared.exe
Remediation
Move Cloudflared to a standard installation directory:
  1. Stop the service: sc stop Cloudflared
  2. Copy binary: Copy-Item cloudflared.exe 'C:\Program Files\Cloudflare\cloudflared.exe'
  3. Update service path: sc config Cloudflared binPath= '"C:\Program Files\Cloudflare\cloudflared.exe" --config ...'
  4. Start the service: sc start Cloudflared
  5. Remove old binary from user profile

Alternatively, install via winget: winget install Cloudflare.cloudflared
DEM-013 Low T1078.003

Three Local Administrator Accounts

The local Administrators group contains 3 members: the built-in Administrator account (disabled), a service account, and the primary user. While manageable, each administrator account increases the credential attack surface. Best practice is to minimise admin group membership and use standard accounts for daily operations.

Likelihood
Impact
Evidence & Remediation
Evidence
Get-LocalGroupMember -Group 'Administrators'
DEMO-WS01\Administrator (User, Local) — Disabled
DEMO-WS01\SvcAccount01 (User, Local) — Enabled, password expires 2026-04-06
DEMO-WS01\User01 (User, Local) — Enabled, no password required

Total enabled admin accounts: 2
Remediation
Review admin group membership:
  1. Verify SvcAccount01 requires admin privileges — if not, remove from Administrators group
  2. Consider using a standard user account for daily operations and elevating via UAC when needed
  3. For managed environments: Deploy LAPS (Local Administrator Password Solution) via Intune

Audit regularly: Get-LocalGroupMember -Group 'Administrators'
DEM-014 Info T1059.001

PowerShell FullLanguage Mode Enabled

PowerShell is running in FullLanguage mode, which provides unrestricted access to all language features including .NET types, COM objects, and reflection. While this is the default and required for administrative workstations, Constrained Language Mode (CLM) on standard user endpoints limits the attack surface available to PowerShell-based malware.

Likelihood
Impact
Evidence & Remediation
Evidence
$ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode
FullLanguage

Note: FullLanguage is expected on admin/developer workstations. CLM is recommended for standard user endpoints in managed environments.
Remediation
For standard user endpoints (not admin/developer workstations):
  Deploy Constrained Language Mode via AppLocker or WDAC policy

This finding is informational for admin workstations — no action required unless organisational policy mandates CLM.

For managed environments: Deploy WDAC (Windows Defender Application Control) policies via Intune to enforce CLM on non-admin endpoints.
DEM-015 Info T1547.001

Multiple Autostart Persistence Entries

The system has 17 autostart entries across startup folders (7) and registry Run keys (10). All entries map to legitimate applications (productivity tools, communication apps, backup agents). While no malicious entries were found, the high count increases the noise floor for detecting rogue persistence, and each autostart entry adds to boot time and attack surface.

Likelihood
Impact
Evidence & Remediation
Evidence
Startup Folder Items (7):
  ActivityWatch, Dell Display Manager (x2), OneNote, ShareX, RustDesk Tray, Tailscale

Registry Run Keys (10):
  Discord, Backblaze, Spotify, Claude Desktop, Spark Desktop, MicroSIP, Teams, Todoist, NebulaTray, Discord (HKLM)

WMI Event Subscriptions: 1 (SCM Event Log Filter — Windows built-in)

All entries verified as legitimate software.
Remediation
Review and reduce autostart entries:
  1. Disable apps that don't need to start at boot (e.g., Spotify --autostart, Todoist)
  2. Use Task Manager > Startup tab to manage impact
  3. Consider removing duplicate entries (Discord appears in both HKCU and HKLM)

Periodically audit: Get-ItemProperty 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
05 — Risk Matrix

Risk Assessment

Findings mapped by likelihood and impact (columns: likelihood, rows: impact)

Risk Assessment Matrix
06 — Persistence (T1547)

Boot/Logon Autostart Execution

19 autostart entries detected outside standard system paths

Registry Run Keys

NameCommandLocation
Discord"C:\Users\User01\AppData\Local\Discord\Update.exe" --processStart Discord.exeHKCU
BackblazeC:\PROGRA~2\BACKBL~1\bzbui.exe -quietHKCU
SpotifyC:\Users\User01\AppData\Roaming\Spotify\Spotify.exe --autostart --minimizedHKCU
Claude"C:\Users\User01\AppData\Local\AnthropicClaude\claude.exe" --startupHKCU
(default)HKCU
Spark DesktopC:\Users\User01\AppData\Local\Programs\SparkDesktop\Spark Desktop.exeHKCU
MicroSIP"C:\Users\User01\AppData\Local\MicroSIP\microsip.exe" /minimizedHKCU
Teams"C:\Users\User01\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\MSTeams_8wekyb3d8bbwe\ms-teams.exe" msteams:system-initiatedHKCU
com.todoistC:\Users\User01\AppData\Local\Programs\todoist\Todoist.exeHKCU
NebulaTray"C:\Users\User01\.local\bin\nebula-tray.exe"HKCU
DiscordC:\ProgramData\SquirrelMachineInstalls\Discord.exe --checkInstallHKLM

Startup Folder Items

NameTypeLocation
ActivityWatch.lnk.lnkC:\Users\User01\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup
DDM2.0.lnk.lnkC:\Users\User01\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup
Send to OneNote.lnk.lnkC:\Users\User01\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup
ShareX.lnk.lnkC:\Users\User01\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup
Dell Display Manager.lnk.lnkC:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp
RustDesk Tray.lnk.lnkC:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp
Tailscale.lnk.lnkC:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp
07 — Valid Accounts (T1078)

Local User Accounts

2 enabled accounts, 3 administrators

UsernameEnabledLast LogonPassword Expires
AdministratorNoNeverNever
DefaultAccountNoNeverNever
GuestNoNeverNever
SvcAccount01Yes2026-02-24T06:09:132026-04-06T05:06:25
User01Yes2026-03-06T06:00:01Never
WDAGUtilityAccountNoNever2025-02-25T08:16:40

Account Anomalies

UserIssueSeverity
User01Password never expiresmedium
User01No password requiredhigh

Administrators Group

NameTypeSource
DEMO-WS01\AdministratorUserLocal
DEMO-WS01\nxUserLocal
DEMO-WS01\TomUserLocal

Password Policy

max age

42

min length

0

lockout threshold

10

lockout duration

10

08 — Network Services (T1046)

Network Service Discovery

31 non-loopback listeners, 4 high-risk services exposed

⚠ High-Risk Exposed Services

PostgreSQL (port 5432) — postgres
RDP (port 3389) — svchost
PostgreSQL (port 5432) — postgres
RDP (port 3389) — svchost

Listening Ports (non-system)

PortAddressProcessPID
60811::Antigravity12800
49681::services1232
49670::spoolsv5764
49669::svchost4556
49668::svchost3668
49667::svchost3516
49665::wininit1152
32977fd00::1tailscaled9348
21119::hbbr9060
21118::hbbs9024
21117::hbbr9060
21116::hbbs9024
21115::hbbs9024
5432::postgres8616
5357::System4
3389::svchost2000
2179::vmms3336
5567910.100.0.1tailscaled9348
496810.0.0.0services1232
496700.0.0.0spoolsv5764
496690.0.0.0svchost4556
496680.0.0.0svchost3668
496670.0.0.0svchost3516
496650.0.0.0wininit1152
9696127.0.0.2System4
66990.0.0.0Obsidian16268
54320.0.0.0postgres8616
33890.0.0.0svchost2000
21790.0.0.0vmms3336
9120.0.0.0vmware-authd6744

... and 1 more

Firewall Profiles

ProfileEnabledInboundOutbound
Domain&#10003; YesNotConfiguredNotConfigured
Private&#10003; YesNotConfiguredNotConfigured
Public&#10003; YesNotConfiguredNotConfigured
09 — Defense Status (T1562)

Impair Defenses Assessment

2 defense anomalies detected

Tamper protection disabled

Severity: high

Windows Update service: Stopped

Severity: medium

Windows Defender Status

Real-Time Protection

✓ Enabled

Antivirus

✓ Enabled

Tamper Protection

✗ Disabled

Behavior Monitor

✓ Enabled

Cloud Protection

Unknown

Signature Age

0 days

Defender Exclusions

⚠ Active Exclusions Found

Paths: C:\GIT, C:\Users\User01\.ccs, C:\Users\User01\.claude, C:\Users\User01\.npm-global, C:\Users\User01\AppData\Local\fnm_multishells, C:\Users\User01\AppData\Local\Temp, C:\Users\User01\AppData\Local\Temp\claude, C:\Users\User01\AppData\Roaming\fnm, C:\Users\User01\AppData\Roaming\npm-cache, C:\Users\User01\node_modules
Processes: C:\Program Files\FreeFileSync\Bin\*, C:\Users\User01\.npm-global\node_modules\*, C:\Users\User01\AppData\Local\fnm_multishells\*\node.exe, C:\Users\User01\AppData\Roaming\fnm\node-versions\*\installation\node.exe, Everything.exe, git-remote-https.exe, git.exe, node.exe, npm.cmd, npx.cmd, ssh.exe
Extensions: None

UAC Configuration

consent prompt user

3

enable lua

✓ Enabled

prompt on secure desktop

✓ Enabled

consent prompt admin

2

10 — Scheduled Tasks (T1053)

Scheduled Task Analysis

9 non-Microsoft tasks, 3 suspicious

⚠ Suspicious Scheduled Tasks
TaskAuthorRun AsReasons
GoogleUpdaterTaskSystem147.0.7703.0{2794FE61-0FE6-4C22-B52B-36E445402496}NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEMSYSTEMRuns as SYSTEM
SpaceManagerTask$(@%SystemRoot%\system32\spaceman.exe,-2)SYSTEMRuns as SYSTEM
PerformRemediation$(@%systemroot%\system32\WaasMedicSvcImpl.dll,-102)SYSTEMRuns as SYSTEM

Non-Microsoft Tasks

TaskAuthorStateRun As
Monthly Documentation Audit (REP-012)DEMO-WS01\TomReadyTom
VivaldiUpdateCheck-03b93b12826abc18Vivaldi Technologies ASReadyTom
ZoomUpdateTaskUser-S-1-5-21-834384447-3854320417-28516990-1001Zoom Communications, Inc.ReadyTom
GoogleUpdaterTaskSystem147.0.7703.0{2794FE61-0FE6-4C22-B52B-36E445402496}NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEMReadySYSTEM
Backup$(@%SystemRoot%\system32\AppListBackupLauncher.dll,-600)Ready
BackupNonMaintenance$(@%SystemRoot%\system32\AppListBackupLauncher.dll,-600)Ready
UnifiedConsentSyncTask$(@%systemRoot%\system32\unifiedconsent.dll,-102)Ready
SpaceManagerTask$(@%SystemRoot%\system32\spaceman.exe,-2)ReadySYSTEM
PerformRemediation$(@%systemroot%\system32\WaasMedicSvcImpl.dll,-102)ReadySYSTEM
11 — Technique Summary

Assessment Results by Technique

TechniqueNameTacticStatusFindings
T1547Boot/Logon AutostartPersistenceInfo1
T1078Valid AccountsCredential AccessHigh3
T1046Network Service DiscoveryDiscoveryHigh2
T1562Impair DefensesDefense EvasionHigh3
T1053Scheduled Task/JobExecutionClean0
T1059Command and ScriptingExecutionMedium3
T1036MasqueradingDefense EvasionMedium2
T1003OS Credential DumpingCredential AccessMedium1
T1071Application Layer ProtocolCommand and ControlClean0
T1027Obfuscated FilesDefense EvasionClean0
12 — Roadmap

Remediation Roadmap

Prioritized actions to improve endpoint security posture

Now

Immediate Actions

Set password on primary user account (1 minute)
Eliminates unauthenticated access to admin session

Enable Defender Tamper Protection (2 minutes)
Prevents malware from disabling endpoint protection

Restrict RDP to VPN/Tailscale only (10 minutes)
Eliminates remote brute-force attack surface

1-2 wk

Short Term

Enable PowerShell Script Block Logging (5 minutes)
Full forensic visibility into PowerShell execution

Review and reduce Defender exclusions (30 minutes)
Closes detection blind spots in excluded directories

Bind PostgreSQL to localhost only (10 minutes + restart)
Eliminates database exposure to network

1-3 mo

Medium Term

Deploy Credential Guard with UEFI lock (1-2 hours + reboot)
Hardware-backed credential isolation preventing LSASS dumping

Move Cloudflared to Program Files (15 minutes)
Reduces binary replacement risk for tunnel agent

Audit and reduce autostart entries (30 minutes)
Reduces persistence noise floor and boot time

13 — Appendices

Reference Information

MITRE ATT&CK Reference

Enterprise Matrix

Full ATT&CK matrix for enterprise environments

Mitigations

Security controls mapped to ATT&CK techniques

Data Sources

Detection data sources for each technique

Scan Metadata

PropertyValue
HostnameDEMO-WS01
OSMicrosoft Windows 11 Pro
OS VersionMicrosoft Windows NT 10.0.26100.0
Scan Timestamp2026-03-06T10:55:22Z
Modefull
ElevatedYes
Script Version1.0
Report IDDEM-MITRE-2026-002
CONFIDENTIAL — DEMO-WS01 — DEM-MITRE-2026-002